Plato's ethics lie at the centre of his philosophy. His approach to 'how best to live' must deal with questions of what there is in the world where we live -and how we talk, think or know about it. So to grasp his moral theory we need to understand how it is integrated with the enterprise as a whole. Moreover, since he was a dialectician par excellence we must discover what is his method of doing philosophy with us and how he will enveigle us into philosophical inquiry -the answer to these questions may overturn our view of his moral theory.
All talk of Plato must take a preliminary tilt at the windmill -which of the ideas we encounter in the Platonic dialogues belong to Plato himself, and which must be attributed to his master Socrates? There is no short answer to the academic 'Socratic question'. For now, suffice it to register that there is development from the earlier works, such as the Protagoras (1) , to the rich theory of the 'middle period', from the Gorgias (2) to the Symposium (3) and Republic (4). Plato's philosophy is organic, subject to growth and decay; we may look for the flower of his moral theory in the Republic, but must search for its roots in the early period.
To know 'how best to live' we must know what is 'best'. In contrast to the subjectivist or the relativist, Plato supposed that evaluative qualities really belong to the object that is valued. Thus we call something 'beautiful' not because we are pleased by it, but because it genuinely has, independent of being appreciated, the quality of beauty (5) (2) what we really desire is happiness; anything that we appear to desire which turns out badly for us is not the object of our real desire, we did not really want it. Thus desire is for true happiness; and any falling short of that goal may be explained in terms of our having made a mistake about our objectives. So a desire for x only exists if x is genuinely valuable. Now we, subjectivists that we are, tend to view a desire as genuine just when it occurs, irrespective of its object, and to regard the desire as an independent product of the psyche of the individual. Plato, on the other hand, asks us to believe that the desires we think, we have, but which turn out to be sawdust and ashes, are not desires at all. All failure, then, will run counter to our real desire for happiness -all failure will be involuntary.
This view looks too simple. It ignores the possibility of psychological conflict, and denies weakness of the will -knowing the better and doing the worse. As Plato moves away from the Socratic influence he develops a richer view of our psychological make-up than this (11) Plato's answer lies in his account of the virtuous soul. The soul is a complex entity. Reflection will show that the best state of a complex is harmony. That can only occur in the soul when each part has and does its own -when reason rules and the other parts are subdued. Thus, as the health of the body, intrinsically desirable, is physical order, so the health of the soul is psychic harmony -and that is happiness. However, order in the soul is exactly like order in the State -and it is justice. The harmonious soul, then, is the just (virtuous) soul, where reason rules. Such an internal disposition is happiness, which is immune from the invasions of luck.
This analysis is manifestly vulnerable, not least because of its persistent use of analogy, and its insistence on the single meaning of terms (justice in the State = justice in the soul). Instead of an account of behaviour, Plato has presented us with an account of a state, a disposition of the soul. In doing so, he lays himself open to the criticism that his theory is not about morality at all -even if he has explained happiness, his 'justice' is nothing to do with the justice that we know in the world of actions. Similarly, his conception of happiness bears very little relation to our notions, consequentialist as they are. His account is so heavily intellectualist that it even betrays his own complex psychology and offers us instead an arid intellectualist ideal, which bears no relation to us, the individuals he started with. In short, Plato's theory of virtue and happiness is beside the point. Between the crude calculi of his early consequentialism and the rara avis of the philosopher in the Republic a satisfying theory of morality has slipped between his fingers. Yet Plato's theory does remain true to many of our central intuitions about justice, justice as a distributive, static matter (13) . Moreover, his account of happiness reveals some of our unease at a consequentialist morality. One response to misfortune might be the tragic one -to accept it, to learn to live with it. The alternative is to explore our intuitions for a new conception of happiness free from the dangers of contingency. That is exactly what Plato offers us -the freedom of 'peace of mind'. It remains to be seen whether his innovation has gone too far.
Plato's moral theory, as it appears in its full version in the Republic (4) is of a piece with -and as vulnerable as -his whole philosophy. It incorporates elements from his ontology (his theory of what exists): the naturalist approach to evaluative qualities, and the theory of Forms; and his epistemology (theory of knowledge): given that there are real values, they are, ideally at least, accessible to those who know. The knowers are the philosophers, happy in the contemplative life; but they are also the rulers of the ideal State, since they alone know the good, understand perfectly how the State and each member may achieve the most happiness. For the sake of the community, then, they should rule, and their benevolent despotism should be accepted, for therein lie the best interests of the ruled.
Plato is clearly an individualist, even if his political interests sometimes obscure this tendency. Taking it as self-evident that we all pursue happiness he sees himself as justified in doing moral philosophy, and his philosopher-kings as justified in paternalistic activity, provided they maximise the happiness of the individual. In this situation he envisages no separate, independent moral imperative; and he is committed to traditional morality only so far as traditional morality coheres with individual happiness. What is more, Plato is a rationalist: the moral system he offers is one where the conflicts of normal moral life are reasoned away: i) He allows no difference between matters of fact and matters of value: all qualities inhere in their objects. Do they? Even if they do, are they commensurable?
ii) The early view of choice and the rationalism of the Republic psychology suppose that if we know, we choose goods rightly. Do we? Even if we know that virtue is happiness, can we still withstand weakness of the will (14)? iii) The Republic argues that virtue is identical with happiness. Plato supposes that moral terms of value may be identified with the values of prudence. But can morality be explained in terms of prudence? Are all moral imperatives to be analysed in terms of my own interest? If not, we may be unable to show that moral action is reasonable. If so, we may have left out of account some irreducible moral 'ought'. To put the problem another way -it is still an open question whether true altruism is either possible, or to be enjoined. iv) Plato's very enterprise betrays that he is vulnerable to this difficulty. Plato and his philosopher-kings act benevolently by urging on us the means to happiness. However, Plato's own argument does not show how his own benevolent action might be reasonable on his own terms -how it might be in his own interests. Nor does he allow any other imperative to benevolence. He cannot easily demonstrate how the philosopher can be required to return to the world of politics, and rule, given that to do so is against his own interests. Plato's rationalist egoism cannot justify benevolence. v) From the point of view of the subject, the patient or the criminal, however, the benevolent action of legislator, doctor and judge is justified just because it promotes the interests of the beneficiary. He, when he recognises his good, will give retrospective consentvide Plato's psychology of desire -even if he is the incurable criminal treated by euthanasia. The singularity of Plato's system does not allow any counter-claim by the beneficiary -and his intellectualism supposes that the benefit, conferred by he who knows, is genuine. Even if the benefit is secure, however, and we know it to be so, may we not have rights, running counter to our interests, against paternalist interference? vi) In a similar vein, Plato's moral theory appears to ride roughshod over the complexity of our notions of responsibility and culpability. We are inclined to assert responsibility even for failure, and we exculpate ourselves completely only at the risk of destroying our sense of self. Plato, however, is committed throughout his life to the dictum 'no one does wrong willingly', whereby only the good, knowledgeable man leads a life that is voluntary. Against him, we who fall far short of such perfection still resist the swallowing up of ourselves into the morass of paternalist pity.
In short, in the face of such rationalism, we appear to insist on an irrational element in morality -an irreducible 'ought' that cannot be explained in a comprehensive analysis of our interests. We repudiate Plato's moral theory on the grounds that it is reductionist dogma which does not fit the realities of moral life. Yet Plato's intellectualism is ideal, as he himself stresses. The State and the moral agent he describes are, dogmatically, the ideal; but they are impossible. The dialogues detailing the life and death of the philosopher (2) (15) (4) end, puzzlingly, with illfitting, traditional myths. In the lack of fit between traditionalism and the radical innovations of Plato we may discern, I suggest, his true purpose in setting out such a moral theory. In general, Plato is not a dogmatist, since he believes that only dialectic can convince. In that spirit, perhaps the moral theory was constructed as a challenge -a touchstone for unthinking moral views. The contrast between the traditional eschatology of the myths and the radical new moves of the arguments is intended to make us think, not to put doctrines into our minds. The fact that he raises dilemmas and puzzles which are still alive vindicates the procedure: the challenges were accepted, the questions successfully asked about the actual world, the world of moral contradiction.
